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I. INTRODUCTION 
The historical literature contains a range of views on the links between openness and 
productivity performance in Britain since the late nineteenth century. For one group of 
writers, British prosperity has been founded on participation in the international economy, 
with a policy of free trade seen as beneficial irrespective of any protectionist policies pursued 
by other countries (Imlah, 1958; Capie, 1983; 1994; Edelstein, 1982; Irwin, 1996). For others, 
however, the roots of British relative economic decline can be traced back to the continued 
adherence to liberal principles when other countries were abandoning them. Within this 
group, there are those such as Aaronovitch and Smith (1981) and Bairoch (1993), who see 
protectionism as a way of restructuring the economy onto a more favourable development 
path, and others who see the abandonment of free trade in Britain as a second-best policy at 
particular times, necessary as a response to the rise of protectionism abroad (Marrison, 1996; 
Kitson and Solomou, 1990). Although there are now large literatures on tariff reform before 
1914 and the adoption of the general tariff in the 1930s, few writers have attempted to link 
these issues to the debates over de-industrialisation and “globalisation” since the 1970s. This 
paper uses a data set covering the long period from 1870 to 2000, adopting an explicit 
quantitative approach to facilitate comparisons between sub-periods. Particular attention is 
paid to the contribution of different sectors to Britain‟s comparative productivity 
performance, since misleading conclusions can be drawn from a consideration of only part of 
the economy. 
 
 Sections II and III set out the broad trends in productivity performance and the degree 
of openness of the British economy during the period 1870-2000. Although debates over 
protection often make reference to different sectors of the economy, most international 
comparisons of productivity work only in terms of aggregate productivity measures. Here, we 
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draw on the data presented in Broadberry (1998) to examine the links between openness and 
productivity performance at the sectoral level. Although Britain was overtaken by the United 
States during the 1890s and by Germany during the 1960s, the sectoral patterns of changing 
productivity performance are very different from those emphasised in the conventional 
literature. In particular, we point to the importance of the later structural shift out of 
agriculture in the United States and Germany and to overtaking in services rather than in 
industry. In all three countries, trends in openness followed a U-shaped pattern with high 
levels of openness before World War I and after World War II, separated by a protectionist 
interlude. However, whereas the pre-World War I level of openness was surpassed by the 
1970s in Germany and by the early 1980s in the United States, this was not the case in 
Britain, even by 1990. 
 
 Sections IV to VI consider shorter periods in the light of the long run evidence, paying 
particular attention to sectoral issues. First, we see that as a result of the openness of the 
British economy, agriculture was unusually small in nineteenth century Britain, allowing 
resources to be deployed in the higher value added industrial and service sectors. This benefit 
of openness is rarely considered alongside the costs to British industry of retaining open 
markets when tariffs were being raised against British exports. Second, many writers criticise 
the cosmopolitan service sector for neglecting domestic industry. However, this ignores the 
importance of the outward orientation of services for service sector productivity, and the 
growing importance of services for productivity performance overall. Third, the trend of 
British industrial performance was not improved by protection when it was applied in the 
1930s, despite the claims of the tariff reformers. Furthermore, protective attempts to avoid de-
industrialisation after World War II had an adverse effect on productivity performance in 
industry and in the aggregate economy. 
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II. BRITAIN’S LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
Table 1 presents sectoral estimates of comparative labour productivity levels for the US/UK 
and Germany/UK cases over the period 1870-2000, derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c; 
1998; 2006). The United States and Germany were Britain‟s main trading rivals during most 
of this period. The concept of labour productivity used here is output per person engaged. For 
the whole economy, labour productivity in the United States was about 90 per cent of the 
British level in 1870, and the United States overtook Britain as the aggregate labour 
productivity leader during the 1890s and continued to forge ahead to the 1950s. Since then, 
there has been a slow process of British catching-up, but by 1990 there was still a substantial 
aggregate Anglo-American labour productivity gap of more than 30 per cent, which increased 
again during the second half of the 1990s, as US productivity surged with the diffusion of 
ICT (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000). Turning to the Germany/UK comparison, for the whole 
economy, German labour productivity in 1871 was about 60 per cent of the British level, and 
had still reached only about 75 per cent of the British level by World War I.  After a setback 
across the war, Germany again reached about 75 per cent of the British level by the mid-
1930s, rising to about 80 per cent by the late 1930s. After another setback across World War 
II, Germany continued to catch-up, overtook Britain only during the mid-1960s and by 1979 
had a labour productivity advantage of more than 25 per cent. However, this German 
advantage has been much reduced during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 The sectoral patterns of comparative productivity performance are quite varied. Here 
the nine-sector analysis provided in Broadberry (1998) has been simplified onto a three-sector 
basis, distinguishing between agriculture, industry and services, as in Broadberry and Ghosal 
(2002) and Broadberry (2005). Industry includes mineral extraction, manufacturing, 
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construction and the utilities, while services includes transport and communications, 
distribution, finance, professional and personal services and government. Both Germany and 
the United States caught-up with and overtook Britain in terms of aggregate labour 
productivity largely by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving their comparative 
productivity performance in services rather than by improving their comparative productivity 
performance in industry (Broadberry, 1998). 
 
 Broadberry (1993) first established that comparative labour productivity in 
manufacturing has remained stationary in both the US/UK and the Germany/UK cases since 
the late nineteenth century, and Table 1 shows that this result generalises to industry as a 
whole. By contrast, in both cases the aggregate labour productivity ratio moves broadly in line 
with the labour productivity ratio for services. Although both Germany and the United States 
have improved their labour productivity performance relative to Britain in agriculture, there 
has also been a dramatic decline in the importance of agriculture, which can be seen in Table 
2. Whereas in 1870 agriculture accounted for about half of all employment in Germany and 
the United States, by 1999 this had fallen to under three per cent. The shift out of agriculture 
has nevertheless had an important impact on comparative productivity performance at the 
aggregate level. This is because in the late nineteenth century Britain already had a much 
smaller share of the labour force in agriculture, which has had a substantially lower value 
added per employee than in industry or services. Hence the large share of resources tied up in 
agriculture in the United States exercised a significant negative influence on the aggregate US 
productivity performance relative to Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and as the importance of agriculture declined this negative influence was removed. 
Similarly, the relatively large share of resources in German agriculture had a negative effect 
on Germany‟s aggregate productivity performance relative to Britain until after World War II. 
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Note that Germany in 1950 had a bigger share of the labour force in agriculture than Britain 
in 1871.
1
 
 
 The labour productivity differences in Table 1 may be explained in part by differences 
in capital intensity. So before we turn to measures of openness, it will be useful to provide 
estimates of comparative levels of total factor productivity (TFP), where TFP measures the 
productivity of labour and physical capital, weighted by their respective shares in income.
2
 
Comparing Table 3 with Table 1, we see that although capital explains a part of the labour 
productivity differences between the three countries, it is not sufficient to eliminate 
differences in TFP, some of which may be explained by openness.  
 
 For the US/UK case, trends in comparative TFP and labour productivity at the 
aggregate level are similar, but with TFP differences generally smaller than labour 
productivity differences. One point worth noting here is that whereas the United States 
overtook Britain before World War I in terms of labour productivity, it was only between the 
wars that the United States gained a TFP advantage. This would be consistent with the 
emphasis of Abramovitz and David (1973; 1996) on the importance of capital rather than TFP 
in American economic growth during the nineteenth century. It is also consistent with 
McCloskey‟s (1970) claim that Victorian Britain did not fail, in the sense that the United 
States was still catching-up in terms of aggregate TFP levels. In services, too, note that US 
overtaking of Britain also occurred later in terms of TFP than in terms of labour productivity. 
For the Germany/UK case, again comparing Tables 1 and 3 we see that trends are very similar 
                                                 
1
 Conventional shift-share analysis fails to capture the importance of structural change because it is based on the 
assumption that the high rates of productivity growth in the shrinking agricultural sector would still have been 
achieved even if labour had not left the sector. See Broadberry (1998) for an alternative calculation. 
2
The share of capital declines from 0.4 before World War I to 0.25 after World War II. These shares are derived 
from Matthews et al. (1982), Kendrick (1961) and Hoffmann (1965). 
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for comparative TFP and labour productivity at the aggregate level, with differences in TFP 
generally smaller than differences in labour productivity. Note that in industry, Germany had 
caught up with Britain in terms of TFP as well as labour productivity before World War I. 
 
III. TRENDS IN OPENNESS 
1. International trade and protection 
The most commonly used measures of the degree of openness are the shares of imports and 
exports in GDP. Trade ratios can be calculated both for goods and for goods and services. For 
the United Kingdom, the figures in Table 4 show a period of increasing openness before 
World War I, while trade ratios declined during the period between the wars. The early post-
World War II period, although relatively open compared to the interwar period did not match 
the degree of openness seen before World War I. Even by the late 1980s, the British export 
trade ratios had not regained their pre-1914 levels. 
 
 Since we shall be concerned with Britain‟s policies and performance in an 
international context, it will be helpful to consider the trade ratios in the United States and 
Germany, Britain‟s main trading rivals over most of this period. In both Germany and the 
United States, trade ratios declined between the wars and rose again after World War II. In 
contrast to Britain, however, the pre-World War I degree of openness was decisively 
surpassed, by the 1970s in the case of Germany and by the 1980s in the case of the United 
States.  This is also true for trade in goods compared with GDP in goods production which, 
given the rise of non-tradable services over time, is sometimes regarded as a better indicator 
(Feenstra, 1998). 
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 It is natural to link the U-shaped pattern of the trade ratios to changes in the level of 
protection. Figures on the ratio of duties to total imports are given in Table 5. Although this 
ratio gives an imperfect measure of changes in tariff rates, most writers find that it captures 
the broad movements (Capie, 1994: 31-32). For Britain, it is necessary to exclude revenue-
raising duties on tobacco and petroleum to obtain an accurate picture of the pattern of 
protection, particularly since World War II. The trend towards free trade in Britain during the 
nineteenth century is clearly visible, using both the total and adjusted customs revenue to 
import value ratios. The retreat from free trade in the interwar period is equally clear, 
culminating in the General Tariff of 1932. For the post-World War II period, however, it is 
important to remove the customs duties on tobacco and petroleum, which should not be seen 
as protective (Lindert, 1991). Then the return to openness is more apparent. 
 
 For the United States, data are available on the ratio of duties to dutiable imports, as 
well as the ratio of duties to total imports. Although the former ratio is somewhat higher, the 
trend is very similar to that for the ratio of duties to total imports. A declining level of 
protection in the first half of the nineteenth century was sharply reversed during the Civil War 
decade, and although there was a further downward drift in the level during the period 1870-
1913, protection remained high by international standards before World War I. The United 
States remained protectionist between the wars, with the Fordney-McCumber and Hawley-
Smoot tariffs of 1922 and 1930, respectively, before becoming increasingly liberal under the 
GATT system during the post-World War II period. 
 
 German data on the ratio of customs duties to total imports are given in Table 5 for 
the period after the formation of the German Reich. Although there was a small increase 
during the 1880s, the degree of protection was much closer to the British than to the 
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American level. Alternative data on the unweighted average level of duties confirm that the 
scale of the retreat from free trade in Continental Europe towards the end of the nineteenth 
century should not be exaggerated (Liepmann, 1938). Thus, for example, Capie (1983: 26) 
reports an average ad valorem rate of duty of 8.4 per cent for Germany in 1910. The rise of 
protectionism in Germany between the wars, particularly with the growth of bilateralism 
under the Third Reich, is clearly visible in Table 5. Equally clear is the firm embrace of a 
liberal trading policy after World War II. Given the strong trading links with other European 
countries, European integration via the EEC has resulted in very low ratios of customs duties 
to imports in Germany. However, Weiss (1988) offers a qualification to this view, noting the 
growth of subsidies to a number of German industries, thus to some extent undermining the 
liberal regime (Giersch et al., 1992). 
 
2. Trade blocs 
In this section we examine trends in British exports to see how Britain came to be 
increasingly dependent on Empire markets between the late nineteenth century and the mid-
twentieth century. The key factor was the growth of protectionism in the United States and 
Germany during the late nineteenth century, which before World War I culminated in a 
division of the world into spheres of influence by the three major manufacturing countries 
(Taussig, 1892; Schlote, 1952; Hoffman, 1933). A survey of many of the pre-1914 
international combines is given in Plummer (1951: 4-10). The chemical industry was one of 
the most prone to international combination, with formal agreements in alkalis and 
explosives. As Reader (1970: 60) puts it, "In deciding how to share markets, the principle 
generally followed in each group, was that the British member...... should have the markets of 
Great Britain and the British Empire; the European member or members, Europe. Markets 
elsewhere in the world were a matter for negotiation. The USA, the richest, stood alone by 
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reason of the formidable nature of the natives. Latin America, where both British and 
European connections were strong, was apt to be looked upon by American companies, 
particularly in the explosives trade, as being covered by a businessman's version of the 
Monroe Doctrine......... For the purposes of market-sharing the Russian Empire was generally 
taken as a province of Europe and the Chinese as a dependency of the British." 
 
 The upshot of these trends was a clear move towards concentration by British 
producers on Empire markets from the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, as Schlote's 
(1952) data in Part A of Table 6 show, this was a new departure, since there was no clear 
upward trend in the Empire share of British exports between 1830 and 1870. The trend 
towards concentration on Empire markets, particularly the Dominions of Australia, New 
Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Canada and Newfoundland, accelerated in the interwar 
period. The upheaval in the British trade data caused by the independence of the Irish Free 
State does not affect these trends, since the share can be calculated on both the old and the 
new basis in Parts A and B of Table 6. Continuing to 1990 in Part B of Table 6, the share of 
British exports to the original six members of the EEC as well as the share to “British 
countries” can be seen. Clearly the rise to dominance of Empire markets (peaking at 55% in 
1951) was the other side of a serious decline in the importance of Continental European 
markets during the interwar and transwar periods. Imperial Preference was clearly no small 
sideshow for the British economy in the twentieth century. Indeed, as Drummond (1974: 426) 
notes, Imperial economic matters took up more Cabinet time than any other aspect of 
economic affairs between the wars. As late as 1970, more British exports were going to 
“British countries” than to the EEC. Since Britain joined the EEC in 1973, however, trade 
with “British countries” (including the Republic of South Africa and the Irish Republic) has 
dramatically declined in importance. 
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3. The protectionist period 
Although the highest levels of protection for the UK economy were seen in the 1940s, it is 
important to recognise that protectionism was quite significant until the late 1970s. 
Protectionism was the order of the day throughout the years when relative economic decline 
was at its peak. Table 7 underlines the slowness of the retreat from protectionist policies in 
three ways.  First, it is shown that in the late 1950s, virtually across the whole manufacturing 
sector tariffs were considerably higher than in West Germany.  Second, we see that average 
tariff rates for UK manufacturing were still as high in the early 1960s as they had been in the 
1930s.  Third, a measure of trade costs relating to UK-France and UK-Germany trade flows is 
seen to have remained above the 1929 level until the 1970s.  The 1970s fall in trade costs was 
driven by trade liberalization; had this taken place earlier, for example, through accession to 
the EEC at the Treaty of Rome, trade costs could have been below the 1929 level much 
earlier. 
 
IV. FREE TRADE BRITAIN, 1870-1914 
Before 1914, Britain‟s continued commitment to openness despite growing restrictions 
abroad had beneficial effects on aggregate productivity performance through the shift of 
resources out of low value added agriculture and high productivity in Britain‟s cosmopolitan 
commercial and financial service sectors. These factors are rarely given sufficient weight in 
the literature on British growth, which focuses on the difficulties faced by British industry as 
a result of tariffs faced in foreign markets and dumping by foreign producers in the British 
market. This section will consider in turn the situation in industry, agriculture and services 
before turning to an aggregate perspective. 
1. Industry 
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The disadvantage faced by British industry in foreign markets on the eve of World War I is 
easily demonstrated in Table 8. Part A shows ad valorem tariff rates on a number of British 
exports in 1903. The countries are listed in descending order of the degree of protection, as 
measured by the weighted average tariff rate across 31 commodites, using British export 
weights. The average tariff faced by British industrial exporters ranged from 131 per cent in 
Russia to 3 percent in the Netherlands. Part B is taken from Grunzel‟s (1916) study of tariffs 
on a multilateral basis in 1913, with tariffs presented in terms of German marks per hundred 
kilograms. An average of tariffs on this basis would not be meaningful, but it is clear from the 
ordering of countries for individual commodities that the averages in Part A, based on British 
export prices and values, do indeed broadly reflect the multilateral situation. The United 
States was clearly a country with very high industrial tariffs, Germany was moderately 
protective and Britain was a free trade country. Notice also from Part B that Germany had a 
high tariff on wheat, the key agricultural product, a theme that will be taken up in the next 
section. 
 
2. Agriculture 
Although the fact that free traders in nineteenth century Britain pointed to the benefit to 
consumers of cheap grain prices arising from free trade in corn has been widely noted, the 
implications for productivity in domestic agriculture have not really been spelled out (Imlah, 
1958: 145-146). In Britain, the main impact of the grain invasion from the New World was a 
shift of the product mix away from grain towards higher value-added pastoral products, 
coupled with higher capital intensity in what remained of the British arable farming sector (Ó 
Gráda, 1994: 149-156; Brown, 1987: 25-26, 33).  As a result, the high levels of labour 
productivity that already characterised British agriculture during the Industrial Revolution 
were raised still further, and the relatively small British agricultural sector continued to 
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achieve output per worker levels on a par with the United States before World War I. The 
highest levels of labour productivity were recorded in the parts of the New World 
concentrating on pastoral products, especially Australia, New Zealand and Argentina (Rostas, 
1948: 80). In much of continental Europe, however, the response to the grain invasion from 
the New World was an intensification of agricultural protection from the 1870s to World War 
I (Bairoch, 1989: 51-69). With grain prices maintained artificially high by tariff barriers, low 
productivity continental farmers were able to remain in business. Given the weight of 
agriculture in overall economic activity at the time, this had important consequences for 
aggregate productivity performance which lasted well into the post-World War II period. 
 
3. Services 
One of the outstanding features of the period between the mid-nineteenth century and World 
War I was the emergence of Britain as the centre of the world system of trade and payments. 
As a result, Britain‟s cosmopolitan service sector generated between 20 and 25 per cent of 
total exports between 1870 and 1913, as can be seen in Table 4. The major service sectors 
generating exports were transport and communications (particularly shipping), distribution 
(particularly wholesale merchanting) and financial services (particularly insurance and 
merchant banking). Imlah (1958: 70-75) provides figures on the net credits generated by these 
three sectors, which made a substantial contribution to the current account of the balance of 
payments, fluctuating between about 7 and 9 per cent of GDP. For Germany, by contrast, the 
much smaller and less productive service sector generated a net surplus on the current account 
of 2 to 3 per cent of GDP.
3
 
 
                                                 
3
 Figures from Hoffmann (1965: 817, 825-826). 
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 The openness and cosmopolitanism of the British service sector has nevertheless been 
seen traditionally as a problem in much of the literature on British economic growth, which is 
heavily oriented towards manufacturing. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this view 
is the claim that domestic manufacturing industry was starved of capital as a result of 
cosmopolitan financiers based in the City of London directing British savings overseas 
(Kennedy, 1987; Best and Humphries, 1986). Whilst Collins (1990; 1998) provides many 
reasons to be sceptical of this view, we note here two points which have received insufficient 
attention in the literature. First, value added per employee was relatively high in financial 
services, so that Britain‟s large and specialised financial service sector made a positive direct 
contribution to Britain‟s overall productivity position.  Second, the marketed services sector 
including finance was the one in which Britain‟s productivity relative to Germany and the 
United States was strongest in the period leading up to World War I (Broadberry, 2006: 37, 
48). 
 
4. An aggregate perspective 
A number of writers have pointed to a systematic negative relationship between openness and 
growth in this period (Bairoch, 1989; Jacks, 2006; O‟Rourke, 2000) although this remains 
open to question depending on the methodology and sample used (Schularick and Solomou, 
2009; Tena-Junguito, 2009).  This might seem to indicate that the UK would have been well-
served by discarding free-trade policies in favour of the protection that was the norm in 
Continental Europe. 
 
        There are, however, a number of reasons to be sceptical of making this inference.  First, 
a closer analysis suggests that, at best, it is only tariffs on manufacturing and not on 
agriculture that are correlated with growth (Lehmann and O‟Rourke, 2008) yet the politics of 
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protectionism in Europe was based on coalitions that protected both sectors.  In Germany, 
agriculture was much more heavily protected than manufacturing with tariff revenue relative 
to imports at 12% (UK = 1%) compared with 5% (UK = 3%).  Second, the case for protecting 
manufacturing was surely strongest in a context of infant industries and capital market failure.  
This does not fit well with the UK at this time (Michie, 1988) and, as noted above, Britain 
was not in fact falling behind in terms of manufacturing labour productivity before World 
War I. The long-standing transatlantic labour productivity gap in manufacturing was 
stationary between 1870 and 1913 and no other European country was substantially ahead of 
Britain by 1913 (Broadberry, 1997a: 52-57). In any event, the tariff proposals that were made 
by Chamberlain would have tended to divert activity toward traditional sectors such as 
agriculture and textiles rather than new growth industries (Thomas, 1984) and tariff 
protection was irrelevant to the services sector which was the locus of American out-
performance in productivity growth (Irwin, 2001). 
 
        Third, and most important, the long-run effects of free trade on the level of income in the 
UK are likely to have been substantial and positive.  In the recent past the strongest evidence 
of a positive effect of openness on the level of income was provided by Frankel and Romer 
(1999) later confirmed by Feyrer (2009) in a paper which deals very well with the 
identification problem.  Jacks (2006) found that similar but rather stronger results are also 
obtained for the 19
th
 century.  Table 9 reports the implications of this analysis for the UK 
compared with Germany, namely, that the much lower trade exposure of Germany resulting 
from the protectionist coalition implied a substantial income loss. 
 
 These results make sense in the context of Anglo-German productivity comparisons. 
As noted in Broadberry (1997c), Germany had caught up with Britain in all industrial sectors 
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before World War I, but German aggregate labour productivity nevertheless remained at 
about three-quarters of the British level. This can be explained in part by low productivity in 
German services, but agriculture played a more important part since:  (1) the productivity gap 
was larger in agriculture than in services; (2) agriculture accounted for a larger share of 
employment than services; (3) value added per employee was lower in agriculture than in 
services.  Openness promoted a shift out of agriculture into higher value-added services in the 
UK; protection obstructed this in Germany. 
 
V. PROTECTION AND IMPERIAL PREFERENCE, 1914-1950 
Once again, the conventional analysis focuses on industry and neglects the implications for 
agriculture and services. Protectionism was accompanied by a policy of imperial preference, 
which had a significant impact on the geographical orientation of British business activity, in 
services as well as in industry. This was to create difficulties of adjustment when the world 
economy reintegrated after World War II. As for the pre-1914 period, it will be useful to 
consider industry, agriculture and services in turn. 
 
1. Industry 
Kitson and Solomou (1990) accept the conventional view that protectionism was bad for the 
world economy as a whole between the wars, but make the more limited claim that the British 
adoption of a general tariff in 1932 was a second best policy given the extent of protectionism 
abroad. One issue concerns the impact of the tariff on the level of economic activity. A 
cyclical recovery would be expected to have had beneficial effects on productivity in the short 
run, since employment lagged behind output in the economic cycle.
4
 However, the more 
                                                 
4
 Although the direction of the effect is not in dispute, it is likely that Kitson and Solomou (1990) overstate its 
magnitude. Since the tariff was imposed after Britain left the gold standard, any improvement in the balance of 
 17 
striking claim made by Kitson and Solomou (1990: 10-16) is that the tariff caused an increase 
in the trend rate of growth. An obvious difficulty with this argument can be seen in Table 10; 
growth of GDP was faster during the 1920s than during the 1930s.
5
 Even if attention is 
confined to industrial production, the acceleration of growth in the 1930s is surely insufficient 
to warrant claims of a change in trend. However, Kitson and Solomou (1990: 12) argue that 
the high growth of the 1920s was just a cyclical phenomenon bringing the economy back to 
the trend for the period 1899-1929. So although actual growth did not increase during the 
1930s relative to the 1920s, Kitson and Solomou nevertheless see an increase in trend growth 
during the 1930s relative to the trend for the longer period 1899-1929. This can be seen in 
Table 10 for compromise GDP as well as for industrial production. However, the argument is 
obviously highly dependent on the periodisation imposed on the data. If a break in trend is 
tested for rather than imposed, the Kitson and Solomou claim is easily rejected. For industrial 
production over the period 1879-1938, Greasley and Oxley (1996) find a break in trend at 
1920 and crashes at 1914 and 1920, but reject a break in trend at 1929. For GDP, Mills 
(1991) finds a major regime shift only after the deep recession of 1921.  
 
Was the interwar tariff good for productivity performance in British manufacturing? 
Kitson and Solomou (1990) suggest that it was, at least, in the short term, and they report that 
labour productivity growth in industries that were newly-protected in 1932 showed an 
increase of 2.28 percentage points in 1930-5 relative to 1924-30 compared with 0.03 
percentage points in the non-newly protected industries. 
                                                                                                                                                        
trade brought about by the tariff may be expected to have caused exchange rate appreciation, offsetting the 
competitive gain from the tariff (Broadberry, 1986: 132-138). 
5
 Kitson and Solomou (1990: 11) report figures for 1925-29 rather than the conventional peak-to-peak period 
1924-29; this has the effect of showing the growth rate of compromise GDP at 2.0 per cent per annum during 
both the 1920s and the 1930s. The explanation given for the unconventional choice of dates is that “1924 is far 
too close to the 1921 depression to be regarded as a peak year in economic activity.” (Kitson and Solomou, 
1990: 11).  
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        Table 11 revisits this analysis.  We look at a 3-way division of industries into those 
which were protected before 1932 through the McKenna and Key Industry duties, industries 
which received a new tariff of at least 20 per cent under the 1932 Import Duties Act, and 
industries which either received no protection or the general ad valorem duty of 10 per cent 
(and were generally not exposed to import competition) based on the information given in 
Hutchinson (1965) and Sebag-Montefiore (1943).  We also consider longer-run differences in 
productivity growth by comparing 1935-48 with 1924-35 since this is likely to reveal any 
adverse effects of reduced competition on managerial incentives to control costs. 
 
        The results in Table 11 show that granting additional protection in 1932 had a positive 
but statistically insignificant effect on productivity growth in the short run and a negligible 
impact in the longer run.  Interestingly, the difference in productivity growth for 1935-48 
compared with 1924-35 is significantly negative for industries that had experienced a 
prolonged period of protection suggesting that they may have been in the comfort zone for too 
long. Contrary to Kitson and Solomou (1990), there is nothing here to suggest that protection 
was a policy conducive to improved productivity performance. 
 
2. Agriculture 
It is worth noting that the strategic justification for protecting agriculture in peacetime so as to 
secure food supplies during war did not prove to be of much value during the twentieth 
century. As Olson (1963: 138-140) notes, it was Germany rather than Britain that succumbed 
to blockade during World War I. Olson (1963: 138-139) points to the ability of the British 
agricultural sector to expand output on the stored-up fertility of grasslands brought back into 
arable use compared with the inability of German agriculture to maintain output at full stretch 
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in the face of wartime disruption. However, Olson (1963: 146) also stresses the flexibility of 
the British service sector through administration as well as distribution as the decisive factor. 
 
One factor behind the increase of arable output in Britain during World War I was a 
system of guaranteed minimum prices set under the Corn Production Act of 1917. If market 
prices fell below the minimum for the following six years, farmers were to receive deficiency 
payments equal to the difference between the market and minimum prices on the volume of 
output that they produced (Whetham, 1978: 94-95). The system was extended for an 
indefinite term in the Agriculture Act of 1920, but when agricultural prices suddenly 
collapsed the legislation was hastily repealed in 1921 in what became known in farming 
circles as the “Great Betrayal” (Whetham, 1978: 139-141). Apart from a system of beet sugar 
subsidies introduced in 1924, there were few measures to protect agriculture during the 
1920s, which continued to be a difficult time for British farmers, particularly arable 
producers. During the 1930s, however, a wider range of protective measures was introduced 
as prices collapsed still further. Although tariffs and quotas were used in some cases, support 
for agriculture generally took the form of subsidies and marketing schemes. This was partly 
as a result of government desires to keep food prices low, but it also reflected the policy of 
imperial preference. If Britain was to obtain access to Empire markets for industrial exports, 
then Empire farmers had to have access to the British market for agricultural produce. Hence 
Brown (1987: 118) sees protection as a great disappointment to British farmers.  
 
As during World War I, Britain was able to survive blockade by Germany during 
World War II (Olson, 1963: 140). During the later 1930s, as the prospect of war approached, 
the government made preparations for the expansion of agricultural output, and this was 
achieved much more rapidly during World War II than during World War I (Brown, 1987: 
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125-146). Again, it was the possibility of expansion on the grasslands combined with the 
flexibility of the British service sector that proved decisive (Olson, 1963: 146). 
 
3. Services 
Most accounts of inter-war British economic history emphasise the detrimental effects of the 
return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity in 1925. The openness and outward 
orientation of the financial services sector is usually seen as the driving force behind this 
decision, while industry is seen as bearing the costs of the overvalued exchange rate that 
resulted.  The costs of the overvalued exchange rate have been the subject of much debate, 
with a number of studies attempting a quantitative evaluation (Moggridge, 1972; Broadberry, 
1986). However, the benefits for productivity of an outward oriented service sector are not 
usually considered in such studies; this gives the literature a bias towards industry. However, 
as we have seen in Table 1, it is the loss of productivity leadership in services that mirrors 
most closely Britain‟s overall loss of productivity leadership.  
 
 An important motivating factor behind the return to gold was a widespread belief in 
the City that Britain‟s prosperity depended on resurrecting the pre-war liberal international 
financial and trading systems (Pollard, 1970). The downward spiral following the onset of the 
Great Depression in 1929 clearly put an end to such hopes, but there were sufficient signs of a 
revival in the commercial bill acceptance market and new capital issues during the 1920s to 
suggest that such hopes were not completely without foundation (Ellinger, 1940: 374; Balogh, 
1947, 249-250; Broadberry, 2007: 268-272). Furthermore, it is clear that the collapse of the 
liberal world economic order had a much greater negative impact on the highly globalised 
British economy than on either the domestically oriented US economy or the more highly 
protectionist German economy of the pre-1914 period. The response of the British economy 
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to these events was a growing integration within the British Empire, which although possibly 
beneficial in the short run, created long run costs of adjustment. 
 
It should be stressed that the above argument is not intended to deny the costs 
imposed by the exchange rate overvaluation, which arose from a perception that the influence 
of the City of London would be best maintained by a return to gold at pre-war parity. 
However, it does suggest that ex-ante there was also a positive side to the balance sheet, 
which should not be neglected.  Had the return to gold been part of a successful re-
establishment of a globalised world economy rather than the precursor of a globalisation 
backlash, Britain would have gained from expansion of its internationally-oriented market 
services. 
 
4. The legacy of interwar protectionism 
It is important to recognise that the protectionist 1930s cast a long shadow over the post-war 
period in Britain.  Oulton (1976: 81) claimed that “the schedule of effective tariffs in the 
1960s can therefore be regarded as largely the product of the economic, social and political 
stresses of  World War I and the great depression” given the similarity with the 1930s.  This 
is perhaps an overstatement but there is quite a high correlation, as Table 12 reveals; only in 
the 1970s does this evaporate completely.  Clearly, once put in place, the political economy of 
protectionism generates persistence. 
 
        This had unfortunate implications for productivity performance through the impact that 
protectionism had in sustaining market power.  Price-cost margins were very high in post-war 
British manufacturing until the trade liberalization of the 1970s (Crafts and Mills, 2009).  
There is clear evidence that in the early post-war period the weakness of competition 
 22 
contributed to productivity problems and relative economic decline (Broadberry and Crafts, 
1996; Symeonidis, 2008).  This is to be expected given that UK firms were exceptionally 
prone to problems arising from the separation of ownership and control to which greater 
competition could have been an important antidote.  Not surprisingly, Proudman and Redding 
(1998) found that openness and productivity growth were positively correlated across 
manufacturing sectors after 1970. 
 
Kitson and Solomou (1990) stop their analysis at the end of the 1930s, but note in the 
very brief conclusion to their book that the tariff may have prevented the necessary structural 
change that would have accelerated economic growth after World War II.  Quite so. The same 
may be said of the policy of imperial preference. We have already seen in Table 6 that by the 
end of World War II more than half of Britain‟s exports were going to Empire markets, and 
for some industries the Empire share of Britain‟s exports was more than three-quarters.6 This 
may be seen as helping to maintain the level of economic activity in the short run, but 
creating problems of adjustment in the long run. 
 
The trans-World War II period saw an increase in the share of the labour force 
employed in agriculture and industry, which went against the trend since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Within the context of a controlled economy, both capital and labour inputs were 
directed into manufacturing, mining and agriculture on strategic grounds. Yet, as Matthews et 
al. (1982: 235-236) point out, the increase in total factor input growth was offset by a 
decrease in TFP growth, suggesting a tendency to diminishing returns.  
 
VI. BRITAIN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1950-2000 
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Protection for industry and agriculture continued after World War II. The proportion of the 
labour force in manufacturing continued to rise until 1960, as post-war governments sought to 
encourage exports and avoid balance of payments problems while maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate (Matthews et al., 1982: 221). Many restrictions on openness, including quotas, 
tariffs and exchange controls, were needed to maintain external equilibrium with the over-
expanded agricultural and industrial sectors (Foreman-Peck, 1991).  
 
As the world economy reintegrated on a liberal basis, particularly from about 1960, 
British industry faced major problems of adjustment. As well as an inevitable reduction in the 
share of the labour force devoted to industry, there were adjustment costs in switching from 
Commonwealth to European markets. However, the process of adjustment has had benefits as 
well as costs. As productivity growth in manufacturing accelerated during the 1980s, and as 
output and employment expanded rapidly in services, the long period of British relative 
economic decline came to an end. Furthermore, as the European economy became more 
integrated, economies of scale and standardisation helped to reduce the transatlantic 
productivity gaps in industry and services. Although agricultural protection has remained high 
under the Common Agricultural Policy, with adverse consequences for food prices, 
agriculture is now too small a part of the economy for this to have a major impact on 
productivity in the economy as a whole. 
 
1. Industry 
Matthews et al. (1982: 235-236) point to the slowing down of TFP growth despite the 
increase in the growth of total factor input during the trans-World War II period as evidence 
of diminishing returns in manufacturing. Similarly, in mineral extraction, TFP growth became 
                                                                                                                                                        
6
 In 1948, this was the case for fertilisers, cotton cloth, hosiery, carpets, tobacco and glass. 
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negative as the movement of inputs out of the sector slowed down. It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that during the early post-war period the over-extended manufacturing and 
mineral extraction sectors required protection. In the coal industry, import licences were 
granted only to the state-owned National Coal Board for use at times when home production 
fell short of demand (Ashworth, 1986: 47). In addition, the coal industry received substantial 
financial support while its major customers, the electricity supply and gas industries, were 
required to burn more coal than warranted by purely economic considerations (Buxton, 1978: 
239). In manufacturing, the early post-war period was characterised by the widespread use of 
import quotas, while the rationing of key inputs such as steel helped to direct resources 
towards export industries (Foreman-Peck, 1991: 159-160; Dow, 1965: 153-162). As controls 
were removed in line with a return to a more liberal world trading environment, the British 
economy continually ran into balance of payments problems. In 1964 the incoming Labour 
government imposed a surcharge on manufactured imports in an ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to avoid devaluation (Foreman-Peck, 1991: 161). They also imposed a selective 
employment tax (SET) to encourage labour into industrial rather than service sector 
employment (Cairncross, 1992: 158-159). 
 
 British industry faced additional difficulties during the early post-war period arising 
from the legacy of imperial preference policies adopted between the wars. Just when 
investment in marketing and after-sales service was becoming more important, British 
industry found itself oriented towards distant markets in which Britain had secured a strong 
position only through preferential treatment. Sometimes, the preferential treatment was 
rapidly withdrawn after World War II. In the motor vehicle industry, for example, high tariffs 
in Australia effectively closed off Britain‟s most important inter-war market, while exchange 
controls made it difficult to invest in adequate marketing and after-sales service in 
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Continental Europe (Whisler, 1994: 5). Since spare parts were not included in export quotas, 
serious damage was done to the reputation of British cars in this important market (Dunnett, 
1980: 37). In Table 6 we see that during the 1960s there was a dramatic decline in the share of 
British exports going to Commonwealth markets, which were overtaken in importance by the 
EEC during the 1970s. 
 
 The decision to join the EEC in 1973 together with the Kennedy Round of the GATT 
accelerated the process of increasing openness. However, as the process of de-
industrialisation also threatened to accelerate during the 1970s, governments continued to 
protect industry through industrial policies that effectively subsidised “lame ducks” 
(Millward, 1994: 163-165).  The evidence regarding these interventionist policies is that they 
slowed down much-needed structural adjustment.  The picture is that “it was losers like Rolls   
Royce, British Leyland and Alfred Herbert who picked ministers… What was described as 
„picking winners‟ appeared in practice to amount to spending large sums shoring up ailing 
companies” (Morris and Stout, 1985: 873). 
 
        This policy changed under the Conservative governments of the 1980s, with dramatic 
effects on both the size of the industrial sector and its productivity performance. As 
employment in manufacturing shrank by about 2 million between 1979 and 1989, labour 
productivity growth accelerated to 4.2 per cent per annum after stagnating at 0.7 per cent per 
annum during the previous cycle, 1973-1979 (Broadberry, 2004). Table 13 shows the 
dramatic turn-round of British productivity performance relative to Germany in a number of 
industries, notably aerospace, iron and steel, and motor vehicles, the last two of which had 
seen heavy protection removed during the 1970s.  More generally, a difference-in-differences 
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analysis of productivity growth before and after 1979, reported in Table 14, suggests that the 
removal of such protection had a favourable impact on productivity performance. 
 
2. Agriculture 
Whereas the encouragement of agricultural production during World War I was followed by 
the virtual elimination of support during the “Great Betrayal” of 1921, World War II was 
followed by the reinforcement of support in the 1947 Agriculture Act (Holderness, 1985: 12-
13). However, the British system of agricultural protection did not involve the sacrifice of low 
food prices for consumers. Building on the pre-war schemes, farmers received deficiency 
payments when market prices fell below guaranteed prices. This was less damaging than the 
variable levy system, which raises the price to consumers as well as producers (El-Agraa, 
1994: 212-214). However, Britain adopted the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC in 
1973, based upon the variable levy system. The scale of support for agriculture during the 
1970s and 1980s was considerable, and this can be seen in the return of Britain to self-
sufficiency in many agricultural products. Even in wheat, where imports accounted for 77 
percent of consumption in 1936-39, imports had fallen to 23 per cent of consumption by 
1980-81 (Holderness, 1985: 174). Nevertheless, agriculture is now such a small part of the 
economy that its impact on the overall level of productivity is relatively insignificant. 
 
3. Services 
As during the inter-war period, the outward orientation of the financial service sector has 
often been seen as a disadvantage during the post-war period. Pollard (1984: 85-88) argues 
that during the Bretton Woods era, the desire to retain an international role for sterling led to 
an overvalued exchange rate, which undermined the competitiveness of British industry. This 
echoes his views on the inter-war period, where he emphasises the costs to industry of the 
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return to gold in 1925 at pre-war parity, but ignores the importance of high productivity in 
services for Britain‟s overall productivity performance. In fact, international financial services 
is one of the few sectors where Britain has retained a strong competitive position (Smith, 
1992). In many other parts of the service sector Britain‟s performance has been 
undistinguished, and it is the deterioration of comparative productivity performance in 
services that accounts for much of Britain‟s relative economic decline overall. Since large 
parts of the service sector have been relatively closed to international competition, it is likely 
that contrary to the Pollard view, it is the sheltered nature of much of the service sector rather 
than the openness of international financial services that has been damaging for overall 
productivity performance. 
 
4. Reversing relative economic decline 
From a low point at the end of the 1970s, relative British economic performance has 
recovered.  By 2007, on the eve of the financial crisis, real GDP per person was about 9 per 
cent ahead of that in the West German Länder and 4 per cent ahead of France compared with 
14 per cent and 12 per cent behind, respectively, in 1979.  A long period of relative economic 
decline with continental Europe had come to an end. 
 
        The evidence suggests that this has been the outcome of a move towards an economy 
based less on protection and regulation and more on competition than in the decades from the 
1950s through the 1970s.  In addition, labour market policies have been conducive to higher 
levels of employment.  In complete contrast to the early post-war period, the UK has become 
an economy with relatively low levels of regulation and relatively strong competition by 
OECD standards (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006; Hoj et al., 2007).  This has been a favourable 
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environment in which to exploit the ICT-era opportunities of new technology especially in 
market services (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005). 
 
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper provides a quantitative economic analysis of the links between openness and 
productivity performance in Britain between 1870 and 1990, paying particular attention to 
sectoral issues and focusing on three sub-periods. (1)  Before 1914, Britain‟s continued 
commitment to openness despite growing restrictions abroad had beneficial effects on 
aggregate productivity performance through the shift of resources out of low value added 
agriculture and high productivity in Britain‟s cosmopolitan commercial and financial service 
sectors. These factors are rarely given sufficient weight in the literature on British growth, 
which focuses on the difficulties faced by British industry as a result of tariffs faced in foreign 
markets and dumping by foreign producers in the British market. (2) Between the wars, given 
the drift into autarky in much of the world, the policies of protection and imperial preference 
can be seen as raising the level of domestic activity, with beneficial cyclical effects on 
industrial productivity in the short run. However, claims of a shift in the trend rate of growth 
cannot be sustained. As for the pre-World War I period, conventional analysis concentrates 
on industry and neglects the implications of the trade regime for agriculture and services. (3) 
Within the controlled wartime British economy, industry and agriculture were expanded on 
strategic grounds, and the expansion continued during the early post-war period for balance of 
payments reasons. As the world economy reintegrated on a liberal basis, however, some de-
industrialisation was inevitable. The adjustment problems of industry were compounded by a 
need to switch from Commonwealth to European markets. However, the process of 
adjustment, which accelerated with the increased openness of the 1980s, has had benefits as 
well as costs. Dramatic improvements in Britain‟s industrial productivity performance and 
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rapid expansion of output as well as employment in services have brought the long period of 
British relative economic decline to an end. 
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TABLE 1: Comparative US/UK and Germany/UK labour productivity levels by sector, 
1869/71 to 1999 (UK=100) 
 
A. US/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1869/71 86.9 153.6 85.9 89.8 
1889/91 102.1 164.1 84.2 94.1 
1909/11 103.2 193.2 107.4 117.7 
1919/20 128.0 198.0 118.9 133.3 
1929 109.7 222.7 121.2 139.4 
1937 103.3 190.6 120.0 132.6 
1950 126.0 243.5 140.8 166.9 
1973 131.2 214.8 137.4 152.3 
1979 156.1 186.0 137.2 145.5 
1990 151.1 163.0 129.6 133.0 
1999 179.6 141.4 127.9 142.5 
 
B. Germany/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1871 55.7 91.7 62.8 59.5 
1891 53.7 99.3 64.4 60.5 
1911 67.3 127.7 73.4 75.5 
1925 53.8 92.3 76.5 69.0 
1929 56.9 97.1 82.3 74.1 
1935 57.2 99.1 85.7 75.7 
1950 41.2 91.8 83.2 74.4 
1973 50.8 121.1 120.1 114.0 
1979 65.5 132.8 131.8 126.5 
1990 75.4 111.0 134.9 125.4 
1999 48.5 84.7 119.5 110.9 
 
Sources: Derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c, 2006); O‟Mahony and de Boer (2002). 
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TABLE 2: Sectoral shares of employment in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, 1870-1999 (%) 
 
A. United States 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
1870 50.0 24.8 25.2 
1910 32.0 31.8 36.2 
1920 26.2 33.2 40.6 
1930 20.9 30.2 48.9 
1940 17.9 31.6 50.5 
1950 11.0 32.9 56.1 
1973 3.7 28.9 67.4 
1990 2.5 21.8 75.7 
1999 1.2 19.5 79.2 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
1871 22.2 42.4 35.4 
1911 11.8 44.1 44.1 
1924 8.6 46.5 44.9 
1930 7.6 43.7 48.7 
1937 6.2 44.5 49.3 
1950 5.1 46.5 48.4 
1973 2.9 41.8 55.3 
1990 2.0 28.5 69.5 
1999 1.9 22.9 75.2 
 
C. Germany 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
1871 49.5 29.1 21.4 
1913 34.5 37.9 27.6 
1925 31.5 40.1 28.4 
1930 30.5 37.4 32.1 
1935 29.9 38.2 31.9 
1950 24.3 42.1 33.6 
1973 7.2 47.3 45.5 
1990 3.4 39.7 56.9 
1999 2.6 29.8 67.6 
 
Source: Derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c); O‟Mahony and de Boer (2002). 
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TABLE 3: Comparative US/UK and Germany/UK total factor productivity levels by 
sector, 1869/71 to 1999 (UK=100) 
 
A. US/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1869/71 99.5 154.2 86.5 95.2 
1889/91 123.0 139.6 64.3 83.3 
1909/11 118.7 150.9 71.6 90.5 
1919/20 133.1 158.3 92.1 108.2 
1929 118.0 187.8 92.0 112.7 
1937 119.2 161.2 89.1 105.9 
1950 132.6 217.6 110.2 138.1 
1973 125.9 202.2 120.6 137.4 
1990 138.8 157.3 119.8 125.3 
1999 129.2 130.5 123.3 125.0 
 
B. Germany/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1871 58.4 90.5 67.2 61.6 
1891 59.8 91.6 65.5 63.2 
1911 71.6 106.1 76.4 75.4 
1925 57.0 92.9 83.6 74.3 
1929 59.3 96.0 90.0 78.5 
1935 59.6 97.1 88.8 78.2 
1950 44.7 89.4 89.3 76.2 
1973 48.1 105.7 127.6 108.6 
1990 65.4 98.5 139.0 116.5 
1999 47.5 78.8 109.9 95.4 
 
Sources: Derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c); O‟Mahony and de Boer (2002). 
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TABLE 4: Trade ratios, 1870-1990 (% of GDP) 
 
A. United Kingdom 
 Imports  Exports 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
1870 24.9 27.1  22.0 29.1 
1890 26.6 28.8  22.9 29.8 
1913 28.6 30.9  25.3 32.4 
1925 26.0 29.2  20.3 24.9 
1929 23.6 26.8  18.1 23.2 
1938 15.2 18.0  10.1 13.6 
1950 17.9 23.8  17.5 23.2 
1970 15.7 21.4  15.7 22.2 
1990 21.9 26.9  18.5 24.2 
 
B. United States 
 Imports  Exports 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
1870 5.7 6.2  5.6 6.6 
1890 6.5 7.2  6.9 7.2 
1913 4.6 5.6  6.6 6.8 
1925 4.6 5.4  5.4 5.8 
1929 4.4 5.4  5.1 5.7 
1938 2.6 3.3  3.8 4.5 
1950 3.2 4.0  3.6 4.3 
1970 4.0 5.5  4.4 5.6 
1990 9.0 11.3  7.0 10.0 
 
C. Germany 
 Imports  Exports 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
1880 16.6   17.3  
1890 17.5   14.1  
1913 20.5   19.3  
1925 18.5   13.8  
1929 16.9   17.0  
1938 5.6   5.4  
1950 11.7 12.7  11.9 15.1 
1970 15.0 20.5  18.2 22.6 
1990 22.8 26.3  26.6 32.2 
 
Sources: United Kingdom: Feinstein (1972: Tables 3 and 15); Economic Trends Annual 
Supplement; United States: 1870-1929: Trade data from Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Time to 1970, series U2-U4 and U9-U11; GDP from Kendrick (1961) and 
Balke and Gordon (1989); 1929-90: Trade and GDP data from National Income and Product 
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Accounts of the United States, Vol.1, 1929-58, Vol 2. 1959-88, Tables 1.1 and 4.1 and 
Statistical Abstract of the United States; Germany: 1880-1950: Hoffmann (1965), Tables 125, 
127, 248.; 1950-1988: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, 1950 bis 1990, Fachserie 18, 
Reihe S.15, Tables 2.2.1, 2.2.12 and 2.2.13, and Statistisches Jahrbuch für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Customs revenue as a share of import values in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Germany, 1820-1989 (%) 
 
 United Kingdom  United States  Germany 
 Total Excl. 
tobacco 
& petrol 
 Total Dutiable 
imports 
 Total 
1820 24.0       
1830 34.3   57.3 61.7   
1840 25.4 21.9  17.6 34.4   
1850 21.7 17.6  24.5 27.1   
1860 11.6 9.1  15.7 19.7   
1870 7.1 5.0  44.9 47.1   
1880 4.7 2.7  29.1 43.5  5.8 
1890 4.8 2.7  29.6 44.6  8.8 
1900 4.6 2.6  27.6 49.5  8.1 
1910 4.5 2.2  21.1 41.6  7.4 
1913 4.4 2.1  17.7 40.1  6.3 
1920 7.7 4.7  6.4 16.4   
1929 9.7 4.4  13.5 40.1  8.2 
1935 24.5 10.2  17.5 42.9  30.1 
1938 24.1 10.4  15.5 39.3  33.4 
1940 22.7   12.5 35.6   
1945 38.2   9.3 28.2   
1950 31.2 2.9  6.0 13.1  5.4 
1960 30.2 3.9  7.4 12.2  6.5 
1970  3.1  6.5 10.0  2.6 
1980  2.0  3.1 5.7  1.3 
1990  1.4  3.3 5.2  1.3 
 
Sources: Britain: Total customs revenue from Mitchell (1988: 581-586); Total import values 
from Mitchell (1988: 451-454); Customs revenue from tobacco and petrol from Statistical 
Abstract for the United Kingdom, Annual Abstract of Statistics, and National Income and 
Expenditure. Imports of tobacco and petrol from Mitchell (1988: 474-480) and Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. United States: Statistical Abstract of the United States. Germany: 
Customs duties and imports from Mitchell (1975), updated from Statistisches Jahrbuch für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
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TABLE 6: British export markets, 1830-1990 
 
A. British Empire share of British exports of home products 
 % 
1830 26.1 
1840 32.3 
1850 27.2 
1860 32.1 
1870 26.0 
1880 33.7 
1890 33.1 
1900 32.4 
1913 37.2 
1925 39.6 
1929 41.5 
1931 38.8 
1932 41.1 
1933 41.2 
1934 44.0 
 
B. Shares of British exports to “British Countries” and EEC6 (%) 
 British 
Countries 
EEC6 
1907 32.2 24.8 
1912 36.0 22.7 
1924 42.1 18.7 
1930 43.5 18.3 
1935 48.0 14.7 
1948 52.7 9.8 
1951 55.0 10.4 
1954 53.0 13.0 
1958 49.3 13.1 
1963 37.5 20.3 
1968 31.2 19.3 
1970 25.1 21.7 
1980 20.1 34.6 
1990 16.7 41.3 
 
Sources: Part A: Schlote (1952: Table 22); Part B: Annual Statement of the Trade of the 
United Kingdom, London: HMSO. 
Notes: Part A: Old area of trade statistics after 1925 (i.e. United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland); Part B: “British Countries” includes the Irish Free State/Republic and the 
Republic of South Africa, as well as the Commonwealth. 
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TABLE 7: Indicators of protectionism in post-war United Kingdom 
 
A: Average tariff rates on UK manufactures (%) 
 
1932 13.2 
1935 14.7 
1960 14.5 
1963 12.8 
1968 11.2 
 
B: Tariff rates for UK and West German manufacturing, 1958 (%) 
 
 United Kingdom West Germany  
Chemicals 15   8 
Leather 16 12 
Rubber 21 10 
Wood 15   7 
Paper 13   8 
Textiles 23 11 
Non-Metallic Minerals 17   6 
Iron & Steel 14   7 
Non-Electrical Machinery 17   5 
Electrical Machinery 23   6 
Transport Equipment 25 12 
Clothing 26 13 
Instruments 27   8 
 
C: Trade Costs Index 
 
 UK-France UK-Germany 
1929 100 99 
1938 121 122 
1950 122 142 
1960 122 115 
1970 110 105 
1980   74 66 
 
Sources: 
a): Kitson and Solomou (1990), Morgan and Martin (1975) 
b): Political and Economic Planning (1962) 
c): data underlying Jacks et al. (2009) kindly provided by Dennis Novy. 
 
Note: trade costs are inferred from estimates of gravity equations and incorporate the impact 
of all barriers to trade including tariffs, non-tariff barriers, transport costs, communication 
costs etc.
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TABLE 8: Tariff rates on the eve of World War I 
 
A. Ad valorem tariff rates on Britain’s exports in 1903 (%) 
 Average 
of 31 
goods 
Cotton 
yarn 
grey 
Cotton 
fabric un-
bleached 
Cotton 
fabric 
printed 
Pig 
iron 
Tin 
plate 
Leather 
shoes 
Caustic 
soda 
Russia 131 70 207 246 91 110 171 101 
Spain 76 62 145 124 25 58 119 16 
United States 73 48 72 88 26 50 25 36 
Austria-Hungary 35 14 54 65 20 59 11 31 
France 34 14 49 51 19 35 22 27 
Italy 27 14 34 52 13 47 14 8 
Germany 25 9 43 49 16 18 11 21 
Sweden 23 9 30 50 free free 38 free 
Denmark 18 7 15 60 free 17 25 free 
Belgium 13 6 28 27 3 free 10 free 
Norway 12 6 12 50 free free 33 free 
Japan 9 7 7 11 4 9 20 11 
Switzerland 7 3 4 13 1 9 5 1 
Netherlands 3 free 5 5 free free 5 free 
 
B. Multilateral tariffs in 1913, selected commodities (German marks per hundred 
kilograms) 
 Wheat Cotton 
yarn 
Cotton 
fabric un-
bleached 
Cotton 
fabric 
printed 
Laces Bar 
iron 
Sheet 
iron 
Sewing 
needles 
Russia free 108.13 1,161.00 1,404.0 2,539.0 9.89 13.85 641.20 
Spain 6.50 140.00 352.35 299.70 1,093.5 5.18 6.48 243.00 
United States 3.95 67.20 51.87 103.74 45% 2.78 5.56 25% 
Austria-Hungary 5.35 28.05 -- 121.55 561.00 4.25 8.50 144.50 
France 5.66 14.99 86.67 152.28 405.00 6.07 10.93 205.50 
Italy 6.08 26.73 63.18 129.68 405.00 4.86 9.72 64.80 
Germany 5.50 18.00 70.00 120.00 350.00 1.00 4.50 100.00 
Sweden 4.16 22.50 56.25 123.75 450.00 free 4.50 45.00 
Denmark free 7.04 56.80 151.68 227.50 1.17 1.17 75.00 
Belgium free 12.15 64.80 81.00 15% 0.81 0.81 13% 
Norway 4.86 13.50 28.13 123.75 674.50 free free 84.38 
Japan 2.68 22.28 62.70 87.14 69.60 2.09 2.61 175.89 
Switzerland 0.24 16.20 8.10 48.60 81.00 0.24 0.49 40.50 
Netherlands free free 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Great Britain free free free free free free free free 
 
Sources: Part A: British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions; Part B: Grunzel 
(1916: 155-158). 
Notes: Part A: Average calculated using British export weights; Part B: Percentage values 
refer to ad valorem rates. 
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TABLE 9:  Income gains from greater trade exposure: UK vs. Germany.  (%GDP). 
 
 
1890 +17.0 
1913 +10.6 
 
Sources: as for Table 4. 
Note: trade exposure is defined as (Exports + Imports)/GDP and the assumed elasticity of 
GDP to trade exposure is 0.3; this is conservative compared with the estimates in Jacks 
(2006) but in line with the wider literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 10: UK growth rates, 1899-1937 (% per annum) 
 
 Compromise 
GDP 
Industrial 
production 
1899-1929 1.00 1.54 
1924-1929 2.57 2.93 
1929-1937 1.96 3.28 
 
Source: Derived from Feinstein (1972, Tables 6 and 8). 
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TABLE 11: Differences in labour productivity growth, 1924-48 
 
A: Mean (standard deviation) labour productivity growth (% per year) 
 
 Early Protected Additional Duties Others 
 (N=15) (N=42) (N=33) 
1924-30 4.247  (2.576) 0.669  (2.030) 1.752  (2.771) 
1930-35 4.008  (4.903) 2.722  (2.181) 2.485  (2.821) 
1924-35 4.117  (2.614) 1.596  (1.343) 2.066  (1.913) 
1935-48 0.891  (1.740) 0.477  (1.419) 0.838  (2.066) 
 
B: Difference-in-differences analysis 
 
1930/35    1924/30   =    0.733  +  1.321 Additional     0.974 Early 
                                      (1.026)    (1.384)                     ( 0.762) 
 
 
1935/48  -  1924/35  =  1.228  +  0.109 Additional    1.843 Early 
                                    ( 2.993)    (0.200)                   ( 2.510) 
 
 
Note: labour productivity growth calculated from Census of Production and Brown (1964). 
Early-protected industries were silk & artificial silk, glove, chemicals, petroleum, explosives 
& fireworks, match, rubber, scientific instruments, musical instruments, incandescent 
mantles, cinematograph & film products, hardware & holloware, cutlery, motor & cycle, 
watch & clock. 
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TABLE 12: Effective protection rates, 1932, 1968, 1979 (%) 
 
 1932 1968 1979 
Building Materials   32.0 13.7 0.2 
China, Glass   22.5 18.5 0.0 
Coke Ovens   2.5 7.2 0.2 
Chemicals   41.8 33.3 2.2 
Soap & Polishes   26.3 0.3 1.8 
Oils & Paints   16.5 10.1/16.6 4.1 
Iron & Steel   34.0 32.5 2.7 
Non-Ferrous Metals   25.6 3.5 0.5 
Shipbuilding 14.0 2.4 1.3 
Mechanical Engineering   14.4 11.6 4.5 
Electrical Engineering   18.2 44.3 0.8 
Motor & Cycle   41.2 36.3 3.3 
Aircraft   7.4 3.3 1.0 
Railway Rolling Stock   43.1 7.9/44.5 0.9 
Metal Goods     8.7 4.7 3.0 
Cotton & Silk Textiles   10.3 4.3 6.2 
Woollen & Worsted     8.8 5.9 3.5 
Hosiery & Lace   42.9 14.0 21.4 
Other Textiles     9.2 0.3 0.8 
Textile Finishing   9.6 7.1 13.0 
Leather & Fur   22.1 3.6 51.1 
Clothing   21.0 1.1 15.6 
Food Processing   26.8 1.9 3.4 
Drink & Tobacco 11.3 6.4 6.2 
Timber Products   24.4 4.5 4.4 
Paper   20.1 24.0 7.7 
Printing & Publishing   4.3 0.6 4.3 
Rubber   13.3 8.0 1.0 
Miscellaneous Manufactures   22.8 33.9 12.3 
Mean   17.1 8.7/10.8 5.7 
 
Source: based on Kitson et al. (1991), Oulton (1976) and Greenaway (1988) 
 
Note: alternative estimate for oils & paints from Kitchin (1976); alternative estimate for 
railway rolling stock is for 1963 from Kitchin (1976). 
Regression based on Oulton's estimates for 1968 gives ERP1968 = 0.098  +  0.501ERP1932   
                                                                                                          (0.028)    (3.424) 
                                                                                                                                    R
2 
 =  0.28 
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TABLE 13: Comparative Germany/UK labour productivity levels in manufacturing 
(UK=100) 
 
 1973 1979 1989 
Chemicals 103.3 127.6 102.5 
Mineral oil refining 88.2 122.5 107.7 
Plastic products 117.3 126.4 109.7 
Rubber products 124.5 140.3 103.5 
Mineral products 84.1 106.4 90.9 
Ceramic goods 131.5 130.6 125.2 
Glass 99.9 129.5 117.7 
Iron and steel 124.8 263.4 88.9 
Non-ferrous metals 80.5 119.9 112.7 
Plant and steelwork 123.7 125.0 124.9 
Mechanical engineering 125.9 141.9 123.7 
Office machinery 100.7 107.6 86.6 
Motor vehicles 148.5 186.0 123.7 
Shipbuilding 144.6 143.7 105.3 
Aerospace 131.2 200.4 100.9 
Electrical engineering 83.5 101.9 97.6 
Instrument engineering 180.5 171.6 143.6 
Finished metal products 130.0 132.1 127.1 
Toys, sport & musical instruments 115.4 131.8 130.4 
Timber and board 95.3 110.9 105.1 
Wood products 176.4 178.4 150.1 
Paper and board 147.9 215.1 160.2 
Paper products 164.9 174.4 169.1 
Printing and publishing 158.5 189.3 145.3 
Leather and footwear 93.3 84.9 104.8 
Textiles 88.3 110.8 100.6 
Clothing 133.5 123.5 124.2 
Food 101.5 125.3 112.9 
Drink 59.3 59.3 83.0 
Tobacco 42.1 68.7 59.5 
Total manufacturing 119.4 140.0 116.5 
 
Source: O‟Mahony and Wagner (1994: 7). 
Note: Labour productivity measured as value added per hour worked. 
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TABLE 14: Differences in labour productivity growth, 1968-86 
 
A: Mean (standard deviation) labour productivity growth (% per year) 
 
 Protection Removed Others 
 (N= 25) (N=43) 
1968-79 2.819  (1.801) 3.569  (1.766) 
1979-86 4.908  (3.174) 4.252  (2.325) 
 
B: Difference-in-differences analysis 
 
1979/86    1968/79  =  0.692  +  1.397 Protection Removed 
                                      (1.381)   (1.690) 
 
 
Source: labour productivity growth from Oulton and O'Mahony (1994) 
Note:  protection removed is a dummy variable based on a decrease of 10 percentage points in 
the effective rate of protection between 1968 and 1979 in either or both comparisons of 
estimates for 1968 from Kitchin (1976) and Oulton (1976) with those for 1979 in Greenaway 
(1988).  these sectors are SIC 273, 274, 278, 279, 311, 313, 331, 332, 335, 336/7, 338, 361, 
362, 363/4, 368, 369, 381, 390, 395, 411, 461, 462/3, 472/3, 484, 499. 
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